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1. My Cultural Identity and Political Ethics turned out to be at least as much a 
polemical as a purely philosophical work, as the slogan I used for its summary 
– ‘Freedom from Culture’ – is meant to suggest. Yet this is not a slogan that 
one can imagine many who protest against the current ills of the world 
carrying on their banners. In fact they are far more likely to be proclaiming 
some cultural identity than denouncing it in the terms in which I believe it 
deserves to be denounced. It is therefore gratifying that Elvio Baccarini and 
Enes Kulenović, agree with so much of what I say in the book. But what I 
mainly have to thank them for are their penetrating criticisms, and what 
follows here are inadequate and provisional replies concerning questions 
about which I shall have to ponder more. 
Of my two critics Elvio Baccarini is, I suspect, the more concessive. 
Baccarini agrees with me that ‘people are not distinguished pre-politically on 
the basis of supposed deep objective cultural differences’ (p.2) which support 
political claims for special treatment. However, drawing upon Akeel 
Bilgrami’s distinction between objective and subjective identity, Baccarini 
argues that such claims can sometimes be supported on the basis of subjective 
cultural identities instead and, furthermore, that these identities can be deep 
going ones. This, he suggests, is a possibility that I have overlooked. 
In fact, in the book I did not entirely disregard such a subjective 
conception, though I did not relate it to Bilgrami’s account nor draw from it 
the sort of conclusions that Baccarini seeks. In discussing the way people 
supposedly recognise their cultural identity I argued that ‘identity is 
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dependent upon a sense of identity...even though it is attributed as pre-
existing it’ (p. 159). There is, I went on, a slippage here between a sense of 
identity as a perception and as an attitude. So, to have the identity, people 
would need to identify with the cultural features they supposedly recognise in 
themselves. This corresponds to Bilgrami’s idea that a subjective identity 
requires a second-order endorsement of such features, e.g. of certain cultural 
values. Baccarini agrees with Bilgrami that this kind of endorsement can lead 
to the given identity being a deep one, as is manifest when the subject of the 
identity wants the features she endorses to be permanent ones. They mean, 
one might say, that much to her. It is on the basis of such a deep subjective 
identity that Baccarini makes a case for certain claims to political 
recognition. 
It is, however, with the apparent assumption that subjective identities so 
construed are deep going in the sense which I gave to this notion that I have 
difficulty. For in my sense an identity is deep if it is an aspect of her 
psychological functioning which explains much of her behaviour. But this is a 
first-order state of mind, and it is because subjective identies in Bilgrami’s 
and Baccarini’s sense involve second-order states instead that whatever depth 
they had would not equate to this. For just as someone can have a first-order 
desire (e.g. to smoke) without reflectively endorsing it, so conversely someone 
could reflectively endorse the values of a group to which he claims adherence 
without actually internalising these values as first-order features of his 
psychological functioning. That is why throughout my book I am able to 
suggest that only lip service to the values or other positively rated cultural 
features of the group is required for membership to be claimed. No deep going 
internalisation of values is needed, nor could it reasonably be expected from 
all members of the sort of group we think of as supplying a cultural identity. 
There is a difference here between cultural and religious groups which 
casts doubt on the analogy Baccarini draws between them. For Baccarini 
argues that deep subjective cultural identities can be the basis for political 
recognition on the same grounds that religious identities may need to be 
accommodated in a liberal order. He appeals to Joshua Cohen’s view that the 
stringency of the demands that religious convictions impose, in virtue of 
being taken as authoritative, requires that special provision be made to 
accommodate them. Likewise, Baccarini suggests, those elements of a cultural 
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identity which individuals endorse should, so long as they are reasonable, be 
similarly accommodated. Thus such subjective cultural identities have a 
normative force which objective ones, as I argue, lack. Yet surely the 
difference between religious and cultural groups is that the former do demand 
first-order compliance with their dictates and the latter cannot. In many, 
perhaps most religions members can be excommunicated or otherwise 
expelled for violations of their codes. This is not how cultural groups, or at 
least modern western ones, operate: their demands on members are much less 
stringent, which is why I maintain that only lip service is required. 
None of this implies that I disagree with Baccarini about the benefits of a 
liberal regime in catering for the religious or other cultural practices of 
minorities. But, as I think Baccarini would allow, this does not require 
recognition of a cultural group conceived as one sharing a whole way of life, 
as this is often expressed, rather than just a few cultural features. The claims 
of a religion, a minority language and so on can be accommodated without 
the recognition of such separate cultural groups. Baccarini suggests that I 
seem to limit such accommodation to that which serves a minority’s material 
interests and that this would be too restrictive. Certainly it was not my 
intention to deny it to the claims of religion, for example; and I agree with 
Baccarini that the symbols which are significant for a minority may need to 
be publicly accepted. But while Baccarini rightly denies that such acceptance 
cannot imply respect, since respect cannot be demanded, one reason for giving 
acceptance is, I suggest, to avoid showing disrespect. For disrespect can be 
forbidden, and rightly so if its manifestation may provoke an adverse 
reaction. It may bend the twig which then jumps back and hits the bender, as 
in the Isaiah Berlin story from which my own account of cultural identity 
derives. 
 
 
2. Enes Kulenović agrees with me in adopting the bent twig model and 
rejecting the Herderian ‘crooked timber of humanity’ picture, which 
Kulenović characterises as essentialist. However he disagrees with my 
contention that political claims based on assertions of cultural identity 
invariably betray a misunderstanding of what such an identity consists in. 
Rightly understood, Kulenović thinks that cultural identity can be the basis 
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for legitimate political claims. Thus, rather as Baccarini allows that my thesis 
works for identities conceived as objective but not as subjective, so Kulenović 
grants that it works for them if thought of as essentialist but not as socially 
constructed. This, he maintains, is how we ought to think of them, and do so 
think of them if we adopt the bent twig model. It may be worth observing, 
then, that, while essentialism implies the objective conception, not all 
objective identities need be essentialist, since some might be socially 
constructed, with not all members of the group needing to conceive of 
themselves as members under whatever characterisation it is in terms of 
which the group is constructed. However, if I understand him correctly, 
Baccarini would require that each member of a group for which claims are 
made must conceive of himself in these terms, and it is the implausibility of 
this applying to what we think of as cultural groups, by contrast with 
religious ones, that leads me to deny that there really are collective cultural 
identities subjectively conceived, any more than they exist as conceived 
objectively. 
This last point suggests that Kulenović’s criticism that my arguments touch 
only Herderian essentialist notions of cultural identity may be too quick. For 
the social construction of a cultural identity involves trying to get as many 
members of the group as possible to think of themselves in a certain way, to 
adopt, in Bilgrami’s and Baccarini’s term, some shared subjective conception 
of their cultural identity. So one of my claims, though perhaps one that I did 
not emphasise enough in the book, is that it is unrealistic to suppose that 
there ever succeeds in being a sufficient coincidence of self-conceptions 
between putative members of a cultural group for it to be regarded as existing 
on this basis any more than on the basis of shared objective characteristics. 
Before moving on to confront Kulenović’s defence of cultural identity claims 
I have to quibble a little with his account of social constructivism. First, 
Kulenović invokes Patchen Markell’s distinction between cognitive and 
constructivist recognition to argue that, while the former would be involved 
in discerning cultural groups as essentialistically conceived, the latter may be 
part of the formation of a cultural group’s collective identity under social 
constructivism. This, I think, is a mistaken application of the notion of 
constructivist recognition. Constructivist recognition is what is conferred 
upon people by a third party, and it is what cultural groups seek from states 
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or international bodies. But what supposedly constitutes them as groups 
entitled to make such demands is their own members’ recognition, not a third 
party’s. This recognition is, I maintain, taken to be a cognitive one, however 
mistakenly. Second, Kulenović regards the possibility of hybridity and 
dynamic change as telling in favour of constructivism about identity, while 
both these seem to me to be independent of the kind of account we give of 
cultural identity. Under essentialism either feature could be the result of the 
circumstances that individuals or groups are placed in, however regrettable 
these results might be in the Herderian scheme. They would be regrettable 
because either hybridity or easy change casts doubt on how deep going in a 
person’s identity are the cultural characteristics concerned.  
Now it is on the question of the depth of a socially constructed collective 
cultural identity and the relevance of such depth to the strength of political 
claims that I find myself most at odds with Kulenović. For Kulenović  insists 
that ‘many of cultural identity claims in multicultural discourse do actually 
have a deep character’, and that ‘even if something is nothing more than a 
surface part of someone’s cultural identity, it can still offer a basis for a valid 
ethical demand’ (p. 13). Wearing a burqa, he suggests, might be a deep part of 
someone’s identity and, even if it is not, a liberal state should not ban it. 
Now, as should be clear from my discussion of this topic in relation to 
Baccarini’s paper, this is not how I understand depth. Although wearing a 
burqa may be important to someone it is hard to see how it could be important 
for her, in the sense of being an important part of her psychological 
functioning. We should, of course, not disregard the fact that something is 
important to someone, but we have to weigh it against what is important to 
others. However, the consequences of overriding someone’s concerns of this 
kind are, other things being equal, much less serious than those of interfering 
with factors which would affect her psychological functioning adversely. 
On the burqa issue I have no problem with Kulenović’s liberal 
conclusions. As with my reply to Baccarini, I am happy to concede a wide 
variety of special right and exemptions, especially to a group that has been 
discriminated against. I agree with Kulenović that it does not matter whether 
the group is or is not a close knit community or whether all or even most of its 
members engage in the practices for which protection is sought. Where I 
disagree with him is in his assumption that the group’s claim is strengthened 
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by the profession of a common cultural identity or by consequential 
assertions that this identity would be endangered if their demands were not 
met. These seem to me to be mere rhetorical flourishes surrounding what 
might be good reasons for the demands, as, for example, that the practice is 
part of their religion, that it is a longstanding tradition which they would be 
upset to have to abandon or that is of especial aesthetic significance to them. 
In the sense in which multiculturalism is a normative theory about the value 
of acknowledging and accommodating cultural differences I suspect I am as 
much a multiculturalist as Kulenović or Baccarini. But insofar as the term is 
taken to connote a metaphysic of deep cultural identities, however conceived, 
I remain, so far, an unrepentant anti-culturalist, despite their skilful attempts 
to persuade me otherwise. 
 
